The organisation remains responsible for its operational response
In November 2026, the European Commission, ENISA and the EU networks of national cyber authorities issued a joint statement on the attacks. It describes authorities exchanging information, supporting investigations and coordinating across Member States.
The affected organisation manages the operational consequences. It has to protect stock and customers, decide whether to isolate equipment from external networks, keep essential refrigeration running and approve restoration. Those decisions involve operations, facilities, security and the suppliers who installed or maintain the equipment. A designated internal incident lead should coordinate that response.
Reporting duties fall on different parties
Two EU regimes are relevant, with different responsibilities depending on the product and the organisation. The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) governs the security of products with digital elements, and the NIS2 Directive sets cybersecurity duties for organisations in critical sectors.
- Manufacturer
- Since September 2026, the CRA has required a manufacturer to report actively exploited vulnerabilities in its product, and severe incidents affecting the product's security, through the CRA Single Reporting Platform. An early warning is due within 24 hours of the manufacturer becoming aware. The manufacturer must also inform affected users.
- Equipment operator
- An organisation within NIS2 scope reports significant incidents to its national computer security incident response team (CSIRT) or competent authority. Food retail alone is not a listed activity in the directive's food category, so a supermarket may fall outside scope, depending on its other activities and on national law.
- Contractor
- The installer or maintenance firm may hold remote access to the equipment. Its own NIS2 duties depend on its size and on whether its services count as managed ICT services.
For organisations within NIS2 scope, the management body must also approve and oversee cybersecurity risk-management measures, including supply chain security, and can be held liable where the organisation fails to meet those obligations. Supply chain security extends to relevant suppliers of connected operational equipment. Who forms the management body depends on the organisation's governance structure.
Unsupported equipment needs its own decision
A reporting obligation does not necessarily bring a corresponding obligation to provide a security update. The CRA's reporting duties cover products already on the market, including equipment past the end of its support. Its duties to handle vulnerabilities and provide security updates apply to products placed on the market from December 2027, and to older products substantially modified from that point. The organisation therefore cannot assume that a reported vulnerability will be followed by a supplier patch. Management should decide in advance how unsupported equipment will be protected, when it must be replaced and what would trigger its isolation.
Arrangements for leading the response
Management appoints an incident lead and deputy, identifies the executive who will make decisions beyond their authority, and provides cover for each role. The limits of the incident lead's delegated authority should address trading disruption, effects across several sites and safety consequences. Within those limits, the incident lead coordinates operations, security, facilities and suppliers, and acts without waiting for approval.
The organisation needs to agree a response procedure with its suppliers, covering emergency contacts, remote access and the decisions each party can take. Contracts support that procedure with notification timescales and cooperation and access obligations. The procedure also needs a fallback for when a supplier cannot be reached or cannot respond in time, as can happen when several of its customers are attacked at once. Rehearsing the procedure with suppliers tests those arrangements and identifies gaps to resolve.
Where equipment is supplied through installers or distributors, the manufacturer may not know the end operator. The organisation therefore needs a verified route for receiving relevant supplier alerts and assigning action. A contractor may take immediate protective action within the agreed procedure and should promptly inform the incident lead.
Regulatory reporting does not replace internal escalation. The organisation must define when management and the board are informed, by whom and on what basis.
Questions for the board
The board's role is to seek assurance that these arrangements exist and work. Management should answer each question with evidence, and any gap should have an agreed action, an accountable owner and a target date.
- Exposure
- Which operations depend on connected equipment that suppliers install, maintain or access remotely, and do we know who holds that access? Which items are past the end of their support?
- Ownership
- Who are the named incident lead and deputy, and what authority do they hold in writing? Who decides on isolation and restoration beyond that authority, including out of hours?
- Suppliers
- What notification timescales and response commitments have suppliers agreed, and do they include timely information on our exposure, protective actions and recovery?
- Escalation
- At what point, and by whom, are management and the board informed of an incident involving supplier equipment?
- Assurance
- Have we tested an attack affecting several sites when the supplier cannot assist immediately? What gaps remain, who owns them and when will they be resolved?